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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
DUSTIN DYER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHIRRELLIA SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
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INTEREST OF AMICI
Pursuant to the Court’s Order of October 19, 2020 (ECF No. 26), Professors Crocker and
Hasbrouck file this brief.

They are scholars of civil rights with an interest in the sound

development of the Bivens doctrine and qualified immunity. Professor Crocker is an Assistant
Professor of Law at William & Mary Law School. Professor Hasbrouck is an Assistant Professor
of Law at Washington and Lee School of Law. They express solely their own views and not any
views of their institutions.1
INTRODUCTION
This case illustrates how the First Amendment functions as an essential backstop to Fourth
Amendment freedoms—and vice versa. As revealed by the national response to the killing of
George Floyd and so many similar injustices, the ability to record encounters with government
representatives is critical to preserving civil rights, and especially the right to avoid excessive
force. The public only “became aware of the circumstances surrounding George Floyd’s death
because citizens standing on a sidewalk exercised their First Amendment rights and filmed a police
officer kneeling on Floyd’s neck until he died.” Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
977 F.3d 817, 831 (9th Cir. 2020). Indeed, “the proliferation of bystander videos has spurred
action at all levels of government to address police misconduct and to protect civil rights.” Fields
v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). In assessing
this case, the Court should keep in mind the powerful role that video recording can play in
protecting the public—especially communities of color—from abusive government conduct.

1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E), Amici declare that no
party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; that no party or party’s counsel contributed
money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and that no person, other than Amici,
their members or their counsel, contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the
brief.
1
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ARGUMENT
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court outlined a two-step framework for analyzing the
availability of Bivens remedies. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857–58 (2017). The Court applied the same
approach in its most recent Bivens case, Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020). Under
this framework, “[a] court must first consider whether a case presents a new Bivens context.” Doe
v. Meron, 929 F.3d 153, 167–68 (4th Cir. 2019). If so, it “must then conduct a special factors
analysis to determine whether an action should proceed.” Id. at 168. This analysis asks “whether
the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the
costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at
1858). If a factor “cause[s] a court to hesitate before answering . . . in the affirmative,” id. (quoting
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1858), it should “reject the request” to recognize a Bivens claim, Hernández,
140 S. Ct. at 743.
For qualified immunity, the doctrine asks “whether a constitutional violation occurred and
whether the right violated was clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.” Booker v.
S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). The Supreme
Court has encouraged tribunals to address both questions in some situations. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). But courts may “take these steps in either order,” such that
answering the clearly-established question in the negative can render answering the constitutionalviolation question unnecessary. Booker, 855 F.3d at 538.
I.

There are good reasons to recognize a Bivens action against TSA agents who violate
airline passengers’ Fourth and First Amendment rights.
Abbasi and Hernández confirm that the Supreme Court approaches extending Bivens to

new contexts with extreme skepticism. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742–43 (“We have stated
that expansion of Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial activity’ and have gone so far as to observe that

2
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if ‘the Court’s three Bivens cases [had] been . . . decided today,’ it is doubtful that we would have
reached the same result.” (alterations in original) (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856–57)). But
Abbasi and Hernández do not prohibit courts from recognizing additional Bivens claims. Instead,
in the face of separate opinions directly or indirectly urging the Bivens regime’s repudiation, see
Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750–53 (Thomas, J., concurring); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1869–70 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), the Supreme Court again chose to preserve
a (narrow) path to expansion.
With this backdrop in mind, recognizing both Fourth and First Amendment Bivens claims
in the present case would be legally and logically justified.
A.

Fourth and First Amendment Bivens actions against TSA agents are consistent
with prior cases from the Fourth Circuit and the Eastern District.

The Fourth Circuit has assumed the viability of Bivens claims against TSA agents. In
Tobey v. Jones, an airline passenger sued TSA agents, alleging that they violated his Fourth and
First Amendment rights when they called airport police, leading to his arrest, after he removed his
shirt in a screening line to reveal the Fourth Amendment’s text on his chest. 706 F.3d 379, 383–
84 (4th Cir. 2013). Reviewing a decision by Judge Hudson, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of the First Amendment claim, declaring it “crystal clear that the First Amendment
protects peaceful nondisruptive speech in an airport” and concluding that the plaintiff “adequately
pled that [the TSA agents] violated his clearly established First Amendment rights.” Id. at 391,
394.
Tobey did not expressly address the existence of a Bivens remedy, and the Fourth
Amendment claim was not technically at issue because it had been dismissed on grounds not
allowing an interlocutory appeal. But the fact that the majority framed the issue as “whether [the
plaintiff] alleged plausible Bivens claims against [the TSA agents],” id. at 386, and that the dissent

3
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specifically noted a question about “[w]hether the cause of action asserted by [the plaintiff] would
lie under Bivens,” id. at 405 n.* (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), indicates that the Fourth Circuit
assumed the viability of the First Amendment Bivens theory. There can be little doubt that the
court did the same for the Fourth Amendment claim. See id. at 389 (majority opinion) (stating that
“the district court’s Fourth Amendment holding is undermined by its erroneous conclusion that
[the TSA agents] cannot be found liable for [the plaintiff’s] arrest”).
The Eastern District has gone even further in the TSA-defendant context than Tobey did.
In Linlor v. Polson, Judge Cacheris recognized a Fourth Amendment Bivens claim where the
plaintiff sued a TSA agent for excessive force on allegations that the agent intentionally or
recklessly “struck him in the groin” during a screening-line pat-down. 263 F. Supp. 3d 613, 617–
18 (E.D. Va. 2017). Linlor found Tobey’s “suggest[ion] that the airport setting does not, in and of
itself, insulate federal officers from constitutional claims” especially “salient[].” Id. at 620.
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly assumed the existence
of Bivens claims, including as recently as 2014. See Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014).
And Tobey is consistent with decades of Fourth Circuit rulings. See Korb v. Lehman, 919 F.2d
243, 248 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[w]e believe a Bivens action should . . . exist” in a First
Amendment retaliation context but affirming dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds); see also
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that “the complaint sufficiently
pleads a claim under the First Amendment” without addressing the Bivens question).
Some courts since Abbasi have declined to recognize First Amendment Bivens actions
when implementing the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach. Although Vanderklok v. United
States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017), provides an exception, these cases are generally
distinguishable because they rely on circumstances not present here. Some point to factors

4
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particular to the prison and retaliation-claim contexts. See, e.g., Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 322–
25 (3d Cir. 2020). Some place weight on alternative remedial schemes. See, e.g., Mack, 968 F.3d
at 320–21; Loumiet v. United States, 948 F.3d 376, 384–85 (D.C. Cir. 2020). And the Fourth
Circuit rested its decision in Doe on “the existence of an alternative remedial scheme . . . under
the Military Claims Act” and on the fact that the plaintiff’s “claims arose in a military context”
and “would extend Bivens extraterritorially.” 929 F.3d at 169–70.
Even acknowledging the Supreme Court’s increasing hostility to Bivens actions, case law
provides support for recognizing Fourth and First Amendment Bivens claims here.
B.

Fourth and First Amendment Bivens actions against TSA agents are consistent
with the Bill of Rights’ core concerns and history.

Considered in light of the Bill of Rights’ purposes and foundations, the critical role that
cell-phone videos play in public discourse supports addressing their improper search and seizure
through Bivens actions.
The Fourth Amendment protects against both violating a person’s reasonable expectations
of privacy and trespassing against a person’s property. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409
(2012). Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that cell phones trigger Fourth Amendment
safeguards. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (referring to the
collection of cell-phone location data as a tool that “risks Government encroachment of the sort
the Framers . . . drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent”). Dyer’s allegations implicate both the
Fourth Amendment’s traditional property concerns, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (“A
trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally . . . using or intermeddling with a chattel
in possession of another.”), and its modern privacy concerns, see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
403 (2014) (requiring warrants to search cell phones because they frequently contain “the privacies
of life” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 722 (4th Cir. 2019)

5
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(stating that cell phones “feature ‘an element of pervasiveness’” that “‘implicate[s] privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated’ by physical searches” (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 393, 395)).
“The protection of citizens’ right to speak publicly on matters of public concern . . . is at
the very heart of the First Amendment.” Korb, 919 F.2d at 247. Dyer’s allegations implicate this
core concern as well. For the First Amendment secures “the right to gather information about what
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Gathering information about government officials in a form that can
readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and
promoting ‘the free discussion of governmental affairs.’” (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966)).
The historical underpinnings of the Fourth and First Amendments demonstrate why Dyer’s
allegations strike at the heart of these constitutional protections. The English cases of John Entick
and John Wilkes were central to the Fourth Amendment’s development. See Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1886). Entick and
Wilkes were “both authors of political pamphlets critical of the King’s ministers,” and “[a]s a
consequence, both suffered the ransacking of their homes and the seizure of all their books and
papers.” William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393,
397 (1995). They “both sued the officials who ordered or carried out the searches,” and “both won
(and collected substantial damages).” Id. “[I]n both cases Chief Justice Pratt (later Lord Camden)
offered ringing declarations about the importance of limiting executive power to search for and
seize private papers in private homes.” Id. But he also declared that a trespass against papers
offended personal freedom more than a trespass against a home alone—and thus justified greater

6
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damages. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765) (“Papers are the
owner’s . . . dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an
inspection; and . . . where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that
respect.”).
The Constitution’s framers understood the connection between the powers of search and
seizure and the danger of suppressing dissent. “The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the
background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could be an instrument for
stifling liberty of expression.” Stanford, 379 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation omitted). The
Supreme Court has explained that not only “the prohibitions of the Fourth [Amendment],” but also
“[t]he commands of our First Amendment” and the dictates of the Fifth Amendment “reflect the
teachings of Entick v. Carrington.” Id. at 484–85 (internal quotation omitted). For “[t]hese three
amendments are indeed closely related, safeguarding not only privacy and protection against selfincrimination but conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.” Id. at 485
(internal quotation omitted).
The alleged search of Dyer’s cell phone and seizure of a video of potential public import
depicting government officials openly performing government functions echo the abuses that
Entick and Wilkes suffered. The Fourth and First Amendments were designed to counteract
precisely this kind of mischief, and damages supplied the traditional remedy. To the extent that
any constitutional violations are compensable in damages today, the ones alleged here should be
among them. See Tanzin v. Tanvir, No. 19-71, 2020 WL 7250100, at *5 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020)
(“The Government also posits that we should be wary of damages against government officials
because these awards could raise separation-of-powers concerns. But this exact remedy has

7
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coexisted with our constitutional system since the dawn of the Republic.”).
C.

Both claims present new Bivens contexts, but Defendants fail to invoke any
special factors requiring the Court to decline to recognize damages remedies.

Because the Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens claim against TSA agents or for
a First Amendment violation, Dyer’s claims present new contexts. See Doe, 929 F.3d at 169 (First
Amendment claim); Linlor, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (Fourth Amendment claim against a TSA
agent). His suit’s viability thus turns on a special-factors analysis.
1.

Defendants cite no alternative remedial structure.

The presence of “an alternative remedial structure” constitutes an especially important part
of the special-factors inquiry. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (stating that this “alone may limit the
power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action”). The only framework Defendants
cite is the Travelers Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). But TRIP appears to provide no relief to a party in Dyer’s circumstances.
As an initial matter, Defendants’ reliance on Vanderklok is misplaced. In Vanderklok, the
Third Circuit “assume[d] for the sake of discussion that [the TRIP process] was not a meaningful
remedy . . . because [it] appears to be used primarily as a means to challenge inclusion on terrorism
watch lists.” 868 F.3d at 205 (emphasis added). But given the facts,2 the Third Circuit also
acknowledged that the plaintiff may have been able to utilize the program because he “was
‘delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because [he was] wrongly identified

2

In Vanderklok, the TSA subjected the plaintiff to secondary screening because “[i]n his
carry-on luggage, he had a heart monitor and watch stored inside a piece of PVC pipe that was
capped on both ends.” 868 F.3d at 193. The plaintiff alleged that the TSA agent supervising the
screening “was disrespectful and aggressive,” causing the plaintiff to “state[] an intent to file a
complaint.” Id. The plaintiff alleged that the TSA agent then falsely reported that the plaintiff had
issued a bomb threat, which led to the plaintiff’s arrest. Id.

8
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as a threat’” within the terms of statutory law, id. (alteration in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C.
§ 44926(a)), and believed he was “unfairly detained” within the terms of the TRIP website, id.
The present case does not involve allegations related to a terrorism watch list. It does not involve
allegations that Dyer was delayed or denied boarding because he was deemed a threat. Nor does
it involve allegations that Dyer was detained in the same sense.
This case does involve allegations that Dyer’s “‘civil rights [were] violated because [the]
questioning or treatment during screening was abusive or coercive,’” which Vanderklok said the
TRIP “online complaint form” allowed passengers to report. Id. Nowadays, however, language
similar to the text the Third Circuit quoted directs users to a different DHS procedure, which
Defendants do not cite here. See DHS, Submitting the DHS TRIP Application, https://trip.dhs.gov/
(stating that “[i]f the traveler wishes to make a civil rights and civil liberties complaint, he/she may
use the following link to learn more about the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
(CRCL) or use the CRCL Complaint Tool to file a complaint” and mentioning that the CRCL
investigates allegations of “abusive or coercive questioning”).3 All this renders Vanderklok’s
alternative-remedial-structure reasoning inapposite.
Indeed, there are additional reasons to conclude that TRIP would almost certainly not
provide Dyer any redress for his constitutional claims. The TRIP website specifies that the
program “is not designed to address travel issue [sic] related to . . . [d]elayed [sic] during travel

3

The TRIP website further provides that “[i]f your concern relates solely to a belief . . . that
your civil rights have been violated, you may skip to Section ‘Incidents Related to Privacy’ of [the
TRIP] form.” DHS, Submitting the DHS TRIP Application, https://trip.dhs.gov/. That section
provides only the ability to check a box stating “I believe my privacy has been violated because a
government agent has exposed or inappropriately shared my personal information” and to
“describe incident [sic] related to the box(es) you have checked.” DHS, TRIP Application,
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Form/TripForm.

9
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due to a disability or medical condition,” DHS, DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ,
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Home/FAQPage. Dyer’s allegations are at least arguably connected to
a medical condition given that the TSA itself has called infant formula a “medically necessary
liquid[].” Press Release, TSA, TSA Reminds Travelers of Security Procedures for the Carnival
Travel Season (May 2, 2019), https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2019/05/02/tsa-remindstravelers-security-procedures-carnival-travel-season.
The TRIP website, under the heading “When does DHS TRIP Not Apply?,” further states
that “[i]f you have questions or concerns regarding your experience at the [TSA] security screening
checkpoint, please contact the TSA Contact Center.” DHS, DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ,
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Home/FAQPage. This implies that screening-specific complaints do not
fall within TRIP’s purview.4
Finally, the same website section states that “[r]equests for claims or compensation” are
inappropriate. Id. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that an alternative remedial structure
need not provide damages to be relevant for Bivens purposes. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.
But the only remedy TRIP appears to provide is that “[a]ll relevant US Government records will
be updated or corrected as appropriate,” DHS, DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ,
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Home/FAQPage, with passengers receiving a “Redress Control
Number” to “streamline[] the watch list matching process” for the future, DHS, Redress Control

4

Defendants say nothing about the TSA Contact Center, which (among other resources)
provides an online “Complaint” form with a category for “Civil Rights and Liberties.” TSA,
Complaint, https://www.tsa.gov/contact-center/form/complaints. Linlor, however, said the
Contact Center appears to “afford[] individuals only the bare opportunity to make the TSA aware
of a complaint,” which “is not the sort of alternative process that provides a ‘convincing reason
for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.’”
263 F. Supp. 3d at 621–22 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)).
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Numbers, https://www.dhs.gov/redress-control-numbers. That relief does not respond in any way
to Dyer’s claims.
As in Bivens itself, it appears that “[f]or people in [Dyer’s] shoes, it is damages or nothing.”
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).5
2.

The context of this case does not raise national-security concerns
different from contexts in which Bivens claims are already allowed.

Defendants point to national-security concerns surrounding airports as a special factor,
arguing that subjecting TSA agents to Bivens actions would run a serious risk of making them
timid in performing their important job duties. It would be difficult to respond in a more complete
and compelling way than Judge Cacheris did in Linlor:
While the Court agrees that appreciable national security concerns would, if raised,
preclude a Bivens remedy here, Defendant does not adequately explain how this
case presents such concerns. . . . The relevant context here is a TSA officer’s
alleged use of excessive force [under the Fourth Amendment] during an airport
security screening. . . . Defendant’s [motion to dismiss] does little to tie specific
national security concerns to the context under consideration. Rather, it rests
primarily upon generalizations about the sui generis nature of the airport setting.
Defendant is correct that Courts have consistently recognized airports as loci of
special security concerns. . . . But that does not mean generic national security
concerns bar any constitutional claim arising at an airport.
263 F. Supp. 3d at 622–23 (paragraph breaks omitted). For this proposition, Judge Cacheris cited
Tobey and quoted Abbasi’s admonition that “national-security concerns must not become a

5

Defendants suggest that no relief exists here under the Federal Tort Claims Act and do
not mention equitable or declaratory relief. In any event, it is doubtful that these sources could
supply an alternative remedy for Dyer’s alleged injuries. There is a split among district courts in
the Fourth Circuit over the relevance of the FTCA to the Bivens inquiry since Abbasi. Doe v.
United States, 381 F. Supp. 3d 573, 614–15 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (collecting cases). And Dyer likely
has no standing to seek equitable or declaratory relief. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 102, 104 (1983) (holding that to seek such remedies, plaintiffs must establish “a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury” (internal quotation omitted)).
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talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims.” Id. at 623 (quoting 137 S. Ct. at 1862).
“The question,” Judge Cacheris continued, “is not whether airports present special security
concerns—they do—but whether those concerns have any particular bearing on the context at issue
in this case.” Id. The answer, he concluded, was no:
The only specific concern Defendant identifies is the risk that implying a Bivens
remedy here might chill legitimate TSA activity and discourage TSA officers from
performing appropriately thorough security screenings. The risk of deterring
legitimate law enforcement activity through personal liability, however, is not
unique to this context. Indeed, it is a risk that inheres whenever courts imply a
Bivens remedy. Federal officers have, for nearly fifty years, navigated such
concerns while performing Fourth Amendment searches. Many of Defendant’s
observations about the nature of the TSA’s work—for example, that TSA officers
must make split second decisions in a fast moving environment to protect public
safety—are no less applicable to the work of other federal agents who have
successfully contended with Bivens liability.
Id. Judge Cacheris also reasoned that the conduct in question “is not conduct that the TSA has
deemed necessary, or even desirable, to protect national security,” but was instead behavior in
which “the TSA expressly forbids its officers to engage.” Id. at 624.
In short, Judge Cacheris explained, “Defendant provides no reason to believe that TSA
officers will be uniquely deterred from the adequate performance of their duties if faced with
Bivens liability.” Id. Refusing to recognize a cause of action on this ground, he said, “would
essentially overrule Bivens.” Id. And in any event, he said, “it is the purpose of qualified immunity
to provide TSA officers with the breathing room they require to operate effectively.” Id.
All this logic applies here. Defendants’ briefing “does little to tie specific national security
concerns to the context under consideration.” Id. at 623. Rather, “[t]he only specific concern
Defendant[s] identif[y] is the risk that implying a Bivens remedy here might chill legitimate TSA
activity and discourage TSA officers from performing appropriately thorough security
screenings.” Id. The conduct Dyer alleges “is not conduct that the TSA has deemed necessary, or
even desirable, to protect national security,” but is instead behavior in which “the TSA expressly
12
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forbids its officers to engage.” Id. at 624.6
There thus exists little reason for the Court to handle the invocation of national-security
concerns here any differently than Linlor did. To be sure, the Supreme Court in Hernández—
which postdates Linlor and involved the cross-border shooting of a Mexican teenager by a U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol agent—took a very deferential approach to national-security issues.
See 140 S. Ct. at 745–47. Hernández suggests that courts should be alert to the possibility of
Bivens-preclusive national-security implications any time a suit arises in a sensitive location. See
id. at 746. But in Hernández, the Supreme Court specified that the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) “concluded that [the defendant] had not violated Customs and Border Patrol policy or
training.” Id. at 740. Emphasizing that “‘[n]ational-security policy is the prerogative of the
Congress and President,’” the Court expressed concern about “regulating the conduct of agents at
the border” by “extending Bivens into this field.” Id. at 746–47 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at
1861). Hernández is thus distinguishable here for the same reason that Linlor held previous cases
rejecting Bivens relief on national-security grounds inapposite: “[t]here is no comparable risk of
entangling the judiciary in sensitive matters of national security through second-guessing
executive policy,” for “if anything, this action harmonizes with the TSA’s avowed policy.” Linlor,
263 F. Supp. 3d at 625.7

6

See TSA, Can I Film and Take Photos at a Security Checkpoint?,
https://www.tsa.gov/travel/frequently-asked-questions/can-i-film-and-take-photos-securitycheckpoint (“TSA does not prohibit photographing, videotaping or filming at security checkpoints,
as long as the screening process is not interfered with or sensitive information is not revealed.
Interference with screening includes but is not limited to holding a recording device up to the face
of a TSA officer so that the officer is unable to see or move, refusing to assume the proper stance
during screening, blocking the movement of others through the checkpoint or refusing to submit a
recording device for screening. Additionally, you may not film or take pictures of equipment
monitors that are shielded from public view.”).
7

The Supreme Court in Hernández also differentiated between Border Patrol agents who
13
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Moreover, just as considerations about incentivizing appropriate behavior are already
baked into the qualified-immunity inquiry, considerations about the general national-security
issues involved in air travel are already baked into the constitutional-merits inquiries. See, e.g.,
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000) (stating that the rule requiring
individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment for general crime-control checkpoint stops
“does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like airports and government
buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute”);
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (in disapproving on First Amendment
grounds a statute prohibiting the open recording of government officials performing their jobs in
public, stating that “[n]othing we have said here immunizes behavior that obstructs or interferes
with effective law enforcement or the protection of public safety”). It makes little sense to double
or even triple count these considerations by denying Bivens actions on their account.8
National-security concerns need not defeat Dyer’s assertion of Bivens claims against TSA

“work miles from the border” and those who “are stationed right at the border and have the
responsibility of attempting to prevent illegal entry,” stating that “the conduct of [the latter] has a
clear and strong connection to national security.” 140 S. Ct. at 746. While the work of TSA
officials within an airport setting does not present the same degree of geographic separation, the
conduct of agents performing first-order screenings may involve less of “a clear and strong
connection to national security” than does the conduct of other TSA officials—like specially
designated law-enforcement officers, see 49 U.S.C. § 114, or federal air marshals. Any
determination regarding the functions of specific TSA officials would be more appropriate at the
summary-judgment stage than on the basis of the current briefing.
8

It is worth mentioning that any assumption that public officials generally bear financial
responsibility for Bivens actions misses how the federal government appears to handle such suits.
See James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert, & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal
Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 561, 566 (2020) (“find[ing]
that the federal government effectively held its officers harmless in over 95% of the successful
cases brought against them, and paid well over 99% of the compensation received by plaintiffs”
in the data set).
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agents for their conduct in an airport screening line.
3.

None of the other concerns Defendants cite qualify as special factors.

Defendants assert that the lack of a damages remedy in statutory law is a special factor.
But Defendants would have presumably argued that any express damages relief displaced Bivens
as an alternative remedial structure. In any event, Defendants do not point to an accumulation of
negative implications from statutory law like the kind the Supreme Court found significant in
Hernández. See 140 S. Ct. at 749 (stating that a “pattern of congressional action”—specifically,
“refraining from authorizing damages actions for injury inflicted abroad by Government officers,
while providing alternative avenues for compensation in some situations” —provided “reason to
hesitate about extending Bivens” to extraterritorial injuries).
Defendants also raise the potential need for additional training if TSA agents are subjected
to Bivens suits. But the training required to satisfy Fourth Amendment standards should be
minimal. The safety of the traveling public presents “special needs” justifying “departures from
the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 620 (1989). So where officials conduct these kinds of searches, the Supreme Court has
said they must follow standardized procedures. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)
(requiring standardized criteria or an established routine to govern the opening of containers during
inventory searches to avoid their repurposing for general investigative aims). These procedures
may provide something of a safe harbor. Indeed, the fact that the evidence showed the defendant
had adhered to established procedures ultimately doomed the excessive-force claim in Linlor. See
Linlor v. Polson, No. 1:17-cv-0013, 2018 WL 10418979, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 1, 2018)
(concluding that because the pat-down occurred in compliance with TSA procedures, the search
was reasonable and the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity). The lesson a TSA agent
would need to learn to avoid inflicting the kind of harm Dyer alleges is even simpler: follow the
15
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agency’s policy allowing recording that does not interfere with the screening process or reveal
sensitive information.
Even in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, this matter presents a strong case for
recognizing Fourth and First Amendment Bivens claims against TSA agents for conduct occurring
in airport screening lines. At the very least, the Court could recognize the Fourth Amendment
claim alone, given its closer connection to Bivens itself. Or the Court could recognize the First
Amendment claim because of its integral connection to the Fourth Amendment claim, leaving
broader questions about First Amendment claims for another day. Finally, if the Court declines to
expand Bivens to a new constitutional right, it should confine its reasoning to the airport setting,
preserving the possibility that plaintiffs in different circumstances could pursue First Amendment
claims against federal officials in the future.
II.

There are good reasons to reject Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity.
Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity is fragmentary and flawed.
A.

Defendants have waived this defense for the Fourth Amendment claim.

Defendants do not assert qualified immunity from Dyer’s Fourth Amendment claim and
have therefore waived the defense for now. See English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir.
1994) (“[A] defendant who fails to timely assert the defense [of qualified immunity] prior to
discovery may waive the right to avoid discovery but may nonetheless raise the issue after
discovery on summary judgment or at trial.”).
B.

The First Amendment right appears to be clearly established.

Defendants do assert qualified immunity from Dyer’s First Amendment claim—to some
extent. They relegate the first step of the analysis (regarding whether a constitutional violation
occurred) to a footnote saying there is “good reason” to treat recording TSA agents and recording
police officers differently without saying what that “good reason” might be. The logic of the single
16
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decision they cite is quite strained. See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 11-1009 JB/KBM,
2013 WL 312881, at *54 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2013) (saying, among other things, that the plaintiff’s
filming “diverted the attention of TSA employees, who could have assisted other passengers who
had forgotten their identification and needed to proceed through the alternative screening
procedures so as to be able to board their flights” and “could thus have resulted in delays to other
passengers, causing them to incur increased costs”).
Defendants rest almost the entirety of their argument on the second step of the analysis
(regarding whether the right at issue was clearly established). Contrary to their contention, the
status of the right in other jurisdictions matters. In Booker, the Fourth Circuit explained that “[i]n
the absence of controlling authority that specifically adjudicates the right in question, a right may
still be clearly established in one of two ways.” 855 F.3d at 543. First, “[a] right may be clearly
established if ‘a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law . . . appl[ies]
with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). Second, “[a] right may also be clearly established
based on a consensus of cases of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
Both pathways likely lead to clearly established law here. The general constitutional rule
identified in Tobey—that “the First Amendment protects peaceful nondisruptive speech in an
airport, and that such speech cannot be suppressed solely because the government disagrees with
it,” 706 F.3d at 391—applies with obvious clarity to Dyer’s allegations. See Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011) (confirming that the “right to speak is implicated when information
[an individual] possesses is subjected to restraints on the way in which the information might be
used or disseminated” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Taylor v. Riojas, No. 19-1261, 2020
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WL 6385693, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2020) (per curiam) (reaffirming this method of defeating
qualified immunity); Dean v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407, 417–18 (4th Cir. 2020) (same). Indeed,
while identifying on-point circuit precedent to deny qualified immunity in a right-to-record case,
the First Circuit also cited the idea that “some constitutional violations are ‘self-evident’ and do
not require particularized case law to substantiate them.” Glik, 655 F.3d at 84–85 (quoting Lee v.
Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Moreover, a mass of persuasive authority holds that the First Amendment protects a right
to record public officials. According to a recent student note, “[w]ith the exception of the Tenth
Circuit, courts in every circuit have held that there is a general First Amendment right to film
police activities in public, subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions.” Doori Song,
Note, Qualified Immunity and the Clear, but Unclear First Amendment Right to Film Police, 33
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 337, 342–44 (2019) (collecting cases). In particular, the note
tallies, “holdings of the courts of appeals in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, and . . . district court holdings in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits”
recognized the right as of 2019, the year the incident in this case allegedly occurred. Id. at 344.9
DOJ has even taken the same position. See Statement of Interest of the United States, Sharp v.
Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02888-BEL, 2012 WL 9512053 (D. Md. Jan. 10, 2012)

9

The Eastern District is one of the district courts within the Fourth Circuit that has extended
the First Amendment to a right to record police conduct. See Szymecki v. City of Norfolk, No.
2:08CV142, 2008 WL 11441862, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2008). After recognizing this right at
the motion-to-dismiss stage, Judge Morgan granted the individual defendant qualified immunity
at the summary-judgment stage, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a brief unpublished opinion
stating that “the district court concluded that [the plaintiff’s] asserted First Amendment right to
record police activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit at the time of
the alleged conduct” and that “we agree.” Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir.
2009) (per curiam). The Fourth Circuit’s decision was not precedential, and the law in this area
developed considerably over the subsequent decade.
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(“The right to record police officers while performing duties in a public place, as well as the right
to be protected from the warrantless seizure and destruction of those recordings, are not only
required by the Constitution. They are consistent with our fundamental notions of liberty, promote
the accountability of our governmental officers, and instill public confidence in the police officers
who serve us daily.”).
Defendants suggest that this case is distinguishable because it pertains to TSA agents in an
airport. But the reasoning underlying right-to-record decisions applies to TSA agents. See, e.g.,
ACLU of Ill., 679 F.3d at 600 (stating that “a foremost purpose of the Constitution’s guarantee of
speech and press liberty is . . . ‘to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any
person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the
exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them’” (quoting Thomas M.
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 421–22 (1868)). And speech restrictions in
airports, as in other non-public forums, must still satisfy a reasonableness standard, Tobey, 706
F.3d at 388 (citing Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992))—
something the conduct in question here, which contravenes TSA’s own policy, cannot do.
For all these reasons, Defendants do not state a strong case for qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
There are good reasons to recognize Fourth and First Amendment Bivens actions against
TSA agents and to reject Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. Nevertheless,
acknowledging the trend in Supreme Court decisions away from a robust Bivens regime and
believing that the Court could justify ruling either way on the relevant issues, Amici write in
support of neither party. Amici urge the Court to consider the importance of video recording to
exposing and prompting the reform of unlawful government practices.

19

Case 3:19-cv-00921-JAG Document 30 Filed 12/11/20 Page 26 of 28 PageID# 127

Dated: December 11, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Brian D. Schmalzbach
Brian D. Schmalzbach (VA Bar # 88544)
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
Gateway Plaza
800 East Canal Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Telephone: (804) 775-4746
Facsimile: (804) 698-2304
bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com
Katherine Mims Crocker (VA Bar # 87430)
WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL
P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
Telephone: (757) 221-3758
kmcrocker@wm.edu
Anne L. Doherty (pro hac vice)
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
201 N. Tryon Street, Suite 3000
Charlotte, NC 28202
Telephone: (704) 373-4633
Facsimile: (704) 343-2300
adoherty@mcguirewoods.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

20

Case 3:19-cv-00921-JAG Document 30 Filed 12/11/20 Page 27 of 28 PageID# 128

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In accordance with this Court’s Order of October 19, 2020 (ECF No. 26), this brief
complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(5)
because it contains 6,494 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32(f).

/s/ Brian D. Schmalzbach
Brian D. Schmalzbach (VA Bar # 88544)
Attorney for Amici Curiae

21

Case 3:19-cv-00921-JAG Document 30 Filed 12/11/20 Page 28 of 28 PageID# 129

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 11, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. A copy has also been served via Federal Express on
the following:
Jonathan Corbett
958 N. Western Avenue #765
Hollywood, CA 90029
Dustin W. Dyer
9071 W. Broad Street
Henrico, VA 23294
John P. O’Herron
Thompson McMullan, P.C.
100 Shockoe Slip, 3rd Floor
Richmond, VA 23219
/s/ Brian D. Schmalzbach
Brian D. Schmalzbach (VA Bar # 88544)
Attorney for Amici Curiae

22

